Stock Market Reaction to the Appointment of Outside Directors
AbstractThis paper examines the UK stock market's reaction to the appointment of outside (non-executive) board members. Tests conducted using a sample of 714 appointments reported by "EXTEL" between 1 July, 1993 and 31 December, 1996, indicate a strong interaction between appointee characteristics and the magnitude of the agency problem: the share price reaction to outside director appointments is significantly more favourable when board ownership is low "and" the appointee possesses strong ex ante monitoring incentives. In contrast, the appointment of independent and manager-affiliated outside directors does not appear to benefit shareholders on average, even in the presence of serious agency problems. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2003.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Business Finance & Accounting.
Volume (Year): 30 (2003-04)
Issue (Month): 3-4 ()
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0306-686X
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- Abdullah Iqbal & Norman Strong, 2010. "The effect of corporate governance on earnings management around UK rights issues," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 168-189, July.
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