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Intergovernmental Grants And The Positioning Of Presidential Primaries And Caucuses: Empirical Evidence From The 1992, 1996, And 2000 Election Cycles

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  • FG Mixon Jr
  • DL Hobson

Abstract

The present study tests the theory that states can impact the size of the grants they receive (per capita) from the federal government by becoming pivotal players in the federal electoral (primary/caucus) process. That is, by rearranging their presidential primary and caucus dates, states can play an important role in determining the field of candidates for the two major political parties in the United States. States are then likely to be rewarded within the budgetary process at the federal level, which begins with the executive branch. Results from a simultaneous equation system suggest that the impact of the average movement of primaries/caucuses in the sample period (10.36 days closer to 1 January) results in an increase of federal grants of $362 million to $1.2 billion (over a two‐year period) for the average state. These results are consistent with the current pattern in the American political process of more front‐ended presidential primaries and caucuses.

Suggested Citation

  • FG Mixon Jr & DL Hobson, 2001. "Intergovernmental Grants And The Positioning Of Presidential Primaries And Caucuses: Empirical Evidence From The 1992, 1996, And 2000 Election Cycles," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(1), pages 27-38, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:19:y:2001:i:1:p:27-38
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.2001.tb00047.x
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    Cited by:

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    3. J. Zachary Klingensmith, 2019. "Political Entrepreneurs and Pork-Barrel Spending," Economies, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-17, February.

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