IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bap/journl/170305.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Family Ownership, Earnings Informativeness, and Role of Audit Committees: An Empirical Investigation in India

Author

Listed:
  • Prasanna Krishna

    (Department of Management Studies, Indian Institute of Technology ( IIT ), Chennai 600036, INDIA)

  • Ramanathan Geeta

    (Department of Management Studies, Indian Institute of Technology ( IIT ), Chennai 600036, INDIA)

  • Arora Bharat

    (Department of Management Studies, Indian Institute of Technology ( IIT ), Chennai 600036, INDIA)

Abstract

This paper investigates the role and impact of audit committees on the relationship between family ownership and earnings informativeness. The sample set comprises of 368 Indian firms over a period of 6 years (2007-2012) with a panel dataset of 2208 firm-years. Earnings informativeness was measured through the relationship between accounting earnings and cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR). Audit committee independence has statistically significant positive association with earnings informativeness in India. However, family firms exhibit lower earnings informativeness compared to widely held companies. The finding indicates information asymmetry among family firms despite the presence of audit committees. This finding supports entrenchment effect and affirms the type II agency issues of dominating verses minority shareholders among Indian companies. Hence, protection of minority rights assumes tremendous importance for regulators. Audit committee size had a positive impact on the level of earnings informativeness only in widely held companies. Audit fees had a positive impact, while consulting fees paid to auditors had a negative impact on earnings informativeness. This observation lends support to recent regulations restricting auditor engagement for non-audit services. Broadly, the results support the hypothesis that audit committees strengthen earnings informativeness among Indian family firms. The findings enable cross section of stake holders to appreciate the dynamics among governance mechanisms, concentrated control and their impact on the earnings informativeness.

Suggested Citation

  • Prasanna Krishna & Ramanathan Geeta & Arora Bharat, 2017. "Family Ownership, Earnings Informativeness, and Role of Audit Committees: An Empirical Investigation in India," Review of Economics & Finance, Better Advances Press, Canada, vol. 9, pages 57-70, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bap:journl:170305
    Note: The authors acknowledge with thanks to the financial support extended by the NSE-IGIDR collaborative forum for this research. The preliminary draft was presented in the research conference organized by NSE-IGIDR in Mumbai on July 10 and 11, 2014. The authors thank Dr. Rajib Doogar, University of Washington, for the constructive review and feedback, and thank Dr. Subrata Sarkar, IGIDR, and Dr.Jayati Sarkar, IGIDR, Mumbai, for their helpful comments.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.bapress.ca/ref/ref-article/1923-7529-2017-03-57-14.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fama, Eugene F & French, Kenneth R, 1992. "The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 427-465, June.
    2. Villalonga, Belen & Amit, Raphael, 2006. "How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 385-417, May.
    3. Marianne Bertrand & Paras Mehta & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2002. "Ferreting out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 121-148.
    4. Dan Dhaliwal & Vic Naiker & Farshid Navissi, 2010. "The Association Between Accruals Quality and the Characteristics of Accounting Experts and Mix of Expertise on Audit Committees," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 27(3), pages 787-827, September.
    5. Jayati Sarkar & Subrata Sarkar, 2008. "Debt and corporate governance in emerging economies Evidence from India1," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 16(2), pages 293-334, April.
    6. Raja Kali & Jayati Sarkar, 2005. "Diversification, Propping and Monitoring - Business Groups, Firm Performance and the Indian Economic Transition," Finance Working Papers 22357, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    7. Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, 2000. "Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(2), pages 867-891, April.
    8. Woidtke, Tracie & Yeh, Yin-Hua, 2013. "The role of the audit committee and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 1-24.
    9. Fan, Joseph P. H. & Wong, T. J., 2002. "Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 401-425, August.
    10. Boone, Jeff P. & Khurana, Inder K. & Raman, K.K., 2010. "Do the Big 4 and the Second-tier firms provide audits of similar quality?," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 330-352, July.
    11. Manoranjan Pattanayak, 2009. "Disentangling the Performance and Entrenchment Effect of Family Shareholding: A Study of Indian Corporate Governance," Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, Pepperdine University, Graziadio School of Business and Management, vol. 12(4), pages 105-128, Spring.
    12. Kose John & Lubomir Litov & Bernard Yeung, 2008. "Corporate Governance and Risk‐Taking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1679-1728, August.
    13. Raja Kali & Jayati Sarkar, 2005. "Diversification, propping and monitoring: Business groups, firm performance and the Indian economic transition," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2005-006, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    14. Mahbub Zaman & Mohammed Hudaib & Roszaini Haniffa, 2011. "Corporate Governance Quality, Audit Fees and Non-Audit Services Fees," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(1-2), pages 165-197, January.
    15. Menon, Krishnagopal & Deahl Williams, Joanne, 1994. "The use of audit committees for monitoring," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 121-139.
    16. Fama, Eugene F. & French, Kenneth R., 1993. "Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 3-56, February.
    17. Ball, Ray & Robin, Ashok & Wu, Joanna Shuang, 2003. "Incentives versus standards: properties of accounting income in four East Asian countries," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-3), pages 235-270, December.
    18. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, 2003. "Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1301-1327, June.
    19. Pindado, Julio & Requejo, Ignacio & de la Torre, Chabela, 2011. "Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity: Empirical evidence from the Euro zone," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 1389-1409.
    20. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 2000. "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 81-112.
    21. Fan, Joseph P.H. & Wei, K.C. John & Xu, Xinzhong, 2011. "Corporate finance and governance in emerging markets: A selective review and an agenda for future research," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 207-214, April.
    22. Manos, Ronny & Murinde, Victor & Green, Christopher J., 2012. "Dividend policy and business groups: Evidence from Indian firms," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 42-56.
    23. Agrawal, Anup & Chadha, Sahiba, 2005. "Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 371-406, October.
    24. Stuart Turley & Mahbub Zaman, 2004. "The Corporate Governance Effects of Audit Committees," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 8(3), pages 305-332, June.
    25. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, 2003. "Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1301-1328, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Agarwal, Anushka & Chaudhry, Neeru, 2022. "Foreign controlling shareholders and corporate investment," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    2. Khosa,Amrinder & Ahmed,Kamran & Henry,Darren, 2019. "Ownership Structure, Related Party Transactions, and Firm Valuation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108492195.
    3. Hegde, Shantaram & Seth, Rama & Vishwanatha, S.R., 2020. "Ownership concentration and stock returns: Evidence from family firms in India," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    4. Chi, Yung-Ling, 2023. "The agency costs of family ownership: Evidence from innovation performance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    5. Bansal, Shashank & Thenmozhi, M., 2020. "Does Concentrated Founder Ownership Affect Related Party Transactions? Evidence from an Emerging Economy," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    6. Chen, Chao-Jung & Hsu, Chung-Yuan & Chen, Yu-Lin, 2014. "The impact of family control on the top management compensation mix and incentive orientation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 29-46.
    7. El Ghoul, Sadok & Guedhami, Omrane & Wang, He & Kwok, Chuck C.Y., 2016. "Family control and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 131-146.
    8. Massa, Massimo & O'Donovan, James & Zhang, Hong, 2021. "International Asset Pricing with Strategic Business Groups," CEPR Discussion Papers 15746, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Bouzgarrou, Houssam & Navatte, Patrick, 2013. "Ownership structure and acquirers performance: Family vs. non-family firms," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 123-134.
    10. Sumon Kumar Bhaumik & Andros Gregoriou, 2010. "‘Family’ Ownership, Tunnelling And Earnings Management: A Review Of The Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 705-730, September.
    11. Christopher Hansen & Joern Block & Matthias Neuenkirch, 2020. "Family Firm Performance Over The Business Cycle: A Meta‐Analysis," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(3), pages 476-511, July.
    12. Yves Bozec & Claude Laurin, 2008. "Large Shareholder Entrenchment and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Canada," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1‐2), pages 25-49, January.
    13. Ansari, Iram Fatima & Goergen, Marc & Mira, Svetlana, 2014. "The determinants of the CEO successor choice in family firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 6-25.
    14. Byun, Hae-Young & Choi, Sunhwa & Hwang, Lee-Seok & Kim, Robert G., 2013. "Business group affiliation, ownership structure, and the cost of debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 311-331.
    15. Julio Pindado & Ignacio Requejo & Chabela la Torre, 2015. "Does Family Control Shape Corporate Capital Structure? An Empirical Analysis of Eurozone Firms," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(7-8), pages 965-1006, September.
    16. Morck, Randall & Deniz Yavuz, M. & Yeung, Bernard, 2011. "Banking system control, capital allocation, and economy performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 264-283, May.
    17. Nguyen, Pascal, 2011. "Corporate governance and risk-taking: Evidence from Japanese firms," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 278-297, June.
    18. Bodnaruk, Andriy & Massa, Massimo & Yadav, Vijay, 2017. "Family ownership, country governance, and foreign portfolio investment," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 96-115.
    19. Bertrand, Marianne & Johnson, Simon & Samphantharak, Krislert & Schoar, Antoinette, 2008. "Mixing family with business: A study of Thai business groups and the families behind them," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 466-498, June.
    20. Caprio, Lorenzo & Croci, Ettore & Del Giudice, Alfonso, 2011. "Ownership structure, family control, and acquisition decisions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 1636-1657.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Audit committees; Accounting earnings; Earnings informativeness; Cumulative abnormal returns;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bap:journl:170305. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Carlson (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.bapress.ca .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.