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What If Everything We Know About Safety Is Wrong?

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  • Semmens, John
  • Kresich, Dianne

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Suggested Citation

  • Semmens, John & Kresich, Dianne, 1987. "What If Everything We Know About Safety Is Wrong?," Journal of the Transportation Research Forum, Transportation Research Forum, vol. 28(1).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ndjtrf:317161
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.317161
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Leonard Evans, 1986. "Risk Homeostasis Theory and Traffic Accident Data," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(1), pages 81-94, March.
    2. John D. Graham & Steven Garber, 1984. "Evaluating the effects of automobile safety regulation," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 3(2), pages 206-224.
    3. Leonard Evans, 1986. "Comments on Wilde's Notes on “Risk Homeostasis Theory and Traffic Accident Data”," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(1), pages 103-107, March.
    4. Peltzman, Sam, 1975. "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 677-725, August.
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