Activists and Corporate Behavior in Food Processing and Retailing: A Sequential Bargaining Game
AbstractThis study examines the strategic interaction between food companies and activists using a game theoretic model of sequential bargaining in the absence of complete information. In a rather confined set of circumstances, findings indicate it is always in the best interest of the food company to comply with activists' demands. More frequently, however, there will be cases where compliance is not optimal, depending on the size of the expected effect of protest, cost of defending against protest, and the cost of protest to the activist.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Agricultural Economics Association in its journal Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 29 (2004)
Issue (Month): 01 (April)
activists; corporate behavior; food industries; sequential bargaining game; Agribusiness;
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- Tonsor, Glynn T. & Wolf, Christopher & Olynk, Nicole, 2009. "Consumer voting and demand behavior regarding swine gestation crates," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(6), pages 492-498, December.
- Mckendree, Melissa G.S. & Olynk Widmar, Nicole & Ortega, David L. & Foster, Kenneth A., 2013. "Consumer Preferences for Verified Pork-Rearing Practices in the Production of Ham Products," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 38(3), December.
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