Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

General Equilibrium with Free Entry: A Synthetic Approach to the Theory of Perfect Competition

Contents:

Author Info

  • Novshek, William
  • Sonnenschein, Hugo

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.jstor.org/fcgi-bin/jstor/listjournal.fcg/00220515/.21-.30
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Literature.

Volume (Year): 25 (1987)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 1281-1306

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:25:y:1987:i:3:p:1281-1306

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: https://www.aeaweb.org/journal
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: https://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Peter Murrell, 1991. "Can Neoclassical Economics Underpin the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 59-76, Fall.
  2. Witteloostuijn, A. van, 1993. "Multimarket competition and business strategy," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-5373416, Tilburg University.
  3. Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio & Ghosal, Sayantan, 2012. "Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders: A Limit Theorem," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 994, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  4. Karp, Larry, 1998. "Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley qt4z62b52k, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
  5. ZHOU, Chaohong & VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN, Arjen, 2009. "Evolutionary game theory and organizational ecology: The case of resource-partitioning theory," ACED Working Papers, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics 2009001, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
  6. Mark Glick & Eduardo M. Ochoa, 1990. "Classical and Neoclassical Elements in Industrial Organization," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 197-207, Jul-Sep.
  7. Javier M. López-Cuñat, 1999. "One-stage and two-stage entry Cournot equilibria," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, Fundación SEPI, vol. 23(1), pages 115-128, January.
  8. Roth, Timothy P., 2000. "Efficiency: An inappropriate guide to structural transformation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 109-126.
  9. Francesca Busetto & Giulio Codognato & Sayantan Ghosal, . "Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders: a limit theorem a la Cournot," Working Papers, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow 2014_01, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  10. Peretto, Pietro F., 1996. "Firm Size, Rivalry and the Extent of the Market in Endogenous Technological Change," Working Papers, Duke University, Department of Economics 96-07, Duke University, Department of Economics.
  11. Jacques-François Thisse & Jean J. Gabszewicz, 2000. "Microeconomic theories of imperfect competition," Cahiers d'Économie Politique, Programme National Persée, Programme National Persée, vol. 37(1), pages 47-99.
  12. Muendler, Marc-Andreas, 2008. "Risk-neutral investors do not acquire information," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 156-161, September.
  13. Andrew F. Daughety, 2006. "Cournot Competition," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0620, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  14. ZHOU, Chaohong & VAN WITTELOOSTUIJN, Arjen, 2009. "Evolutionary game theory and organizational ecology: The case of resource-partitioning theory," Working Papers 2009002, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:25:y:1987:i:3:p:1281-1306. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.