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Appropriate Institutions? Traditional Governance and Public Goods Provision in Oaxaca, Mexico

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  • Gustavo J. Bobonis
  • Juan C. Chaparro
  • Marco Gonzalez-Navarro
  • Marta Rubio-Codina

Abstract

What are the consequences of the adoption of traditional governance institutions among indigenous groups for local government affairs? We study the 1995 Usos y Costumbres traditional governance reform in the state of Oaxaca, which legitimized these structures in a subset of its municipalities. We show that the degree of ethnolinguistic polarization between residents of outlying communities and residents of municipal capitals is an important barrier to the former's political representation in local elections. In terms of public goods provision, villages of ethnic minorities are less likely to gain electric service but more likely to gain sewerage services and public schooling.

Suggested Citation

  • Gustavo J. Bobonis & Juan C. Chaparro & Marco Gonzalez-Navarro & Marta Rubio-Codina, 2021. "Appropriate Institutions? Traditional Governance and Public Goods Provision in Oaxaca, Mexico," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 111, pages 243-247, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:apandp:v:111:y:2021:p:243-47
    DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20211101
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    1. Robin Burgess & Remi Jedwab & Edward Miguel & Ameet Morjaria & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2015. "The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(6), pages 1817-1851, June.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
    • R50 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • O18 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure

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