IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejmic/v9y2017i1p152-216.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

From Peer Pressure to Biased Norms

Author

Listed:
  • Moti Michaeli
  • Daniel Spiro

Abstract

This paper studies a coordination game between a continuum of players with heterogeneous tastes who perceive peer pressure when behaving differently from each other. It characterizes the conditions under which a social norm--a mode of behavior followed by many--exists in equilibrium and the patterns of norm compliance. The emergent norm may be biased compared to the average taste in society, yet endogenously upheld by the population. Strikingly, a biased norm will, under some circumstances, be more sustainable than a non-biased norm, which may explain the bias of various social and religious norms.

Suggested Citation

  • Moti Michaeli & Daniel Spiro, 2017. "From Peer Pressure to Biased Norms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 152-216, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:9:y:2017:i:1:p:152-216
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150151
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20150151
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles/attachments?retrieve=EYAo_NOU728yVohEZOab4x2pF4lT6zRr
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jackson, Matthew O. & Zenou, Yves, 2015. "Games on Networks," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    2. H. Peyton Young & Shmuel Zamir (ed.), 2015. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 4, number 4.
    3. Blumenthal, Marsha & Christian, Charles W. & Slemrod, Joel, 2001. "Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 54(n. 1), pages 125-38, March.
    4. Jean-Paul Carvalho, 2017. "Coordination and culture," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(3), pages 449-475, October.
    5. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-877, October.
    6. Michaeli, Moti & Spiro, Daniel, 2015. "Norm conformity across societies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 51-65.
    7. Blumenthal, Marsha & Christian, Charles W. & Slemrod, Joel, 2001. "Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence From a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 54(1), pages 125-138, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jiabin Wu, 2021. "Stochastic Value Formation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 597-611, September.
    2. Facundo Albornoz & Jake Bradley & Silvia Sonderegger, 2022. "Updating the Social Norm: the Case of Hate Crime after the Brexit Referendum," Working Papers 203, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    3. Charles H. Anderton & Jurgen Brauer, 2018. "The Onset, Spread, and Prevention of Mass Atrocities: Perspectives from Network Models," HiCN Working Papers 284, Households in Conflict Network.
    4. Nan L. Maxwell & Nathan Wozny, 2021. "Gender Gaps in Time Use and Labor Market Outcomes: What’s Norms Got to Do with it?," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 56-77, March.
    5. Ao, Wallice & Wu, Jiabin, 2020. "The silent majority?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    6. David Smerdon & Theo Offerman & Uri Gneezy, 2020. "‘Everybody’s doing it’: on the persistence of bad social norms," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(2), pages 392-420, June.
    7. Spiro, Daniel, 2020. "Multigenerational transmission of culture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    8. te Velde, Vera L. & Louis, Winnifred, 2022. "Conformity to descriptive norms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 204-222.
    9. Chen, Daniel L. & Michaeli, Moti & Spiro, Daniel, 2023. "Non-confrontational extremists," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    10. Eugen Dimant & Michele Gelfand & Anna Hochleitner & Silvia Sonderegger, 2023. "Strategic Behavior with Tight, Loose and Polarized Norms," CESifo Working Paper Series 10233, CESifo.
    11. Duffy, John & Lafky, Jonathan, 2021. "Social conformity under evolving private preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 104-124.
    12. Juan I Block & Rohan Dutta & David K Levine, 2021. "Leaders and Social Norms: On the Emergence of Consensus or Conflict," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001758, David K. Levine.
    13. Roberto Rozzi, 2021. "Competing Conventions with Costly Information Acquisition," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-29, June.
    14. Hallman, Alice & Spiro, Daniel, 2023. "A theory of hypocrisy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 401-410.
    15. Moti Michaeli & Daniel Spiro, 2018. "Prescriptive Norms and Social Comparisons," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-12, December.
    16. Invernizzi, Giovanna M. & Miller, Joshua B. & Coen, Tommaso & Dufwenberg, Martin & Oliveira, Luiz Edgard R., 2021. "Tra i Leoni: Revealing the preferences behind a superstition," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    17. Michaeli, Moti & Wu, Jiabin, 2022. "Fighting polarization with (parental) internalization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 194(C), pages 124-138.
    18. John Duffy & Jonathan Lafky, 2018. "Living a Lie: Theory and Evidence on Public Preference Falsification," Working Papers 181902, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    19. Tverskoi, Denis & Senthilnathan, Athmanathan & Gavrilets, Sergey, 2021. "The dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society," SocArXiv 24svr, Center for Open Science.
    20. Nan L. Maxwell & Nathan Wozny, "undated". "Gender Gaps in Time Use and Earnings: What's Norms Got to Do With It?," Mathematica Policy Research Reports 38f127bf7f494794807db7a3a, Mathematica Policy Research.
    21. Sebastiano Della Lena & Pietro Dindo, 2019. "On the Evolution of Norms in Strategic Environments," Working Papers 2019: 16, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    22. Florian Diekert & Tillmann Eymess & Joseph Luomba & Israel Waichman, 2022. "The Creation of Social Norms under Weak Institutions," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(6), pages 1127-1160.
    23. te Velde, Vera L., 2022. "Heterogeneous norms: Social image and social pressure when people disagree," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 194(C), pages 319-340.
    24. Paulius Yamin & Maria Fei & Saadi Lahlou & Sara Levy, 2019. "Using Social Norms to Change Behavior and Increase Sustainability in the Real World: a Systematic Review of the Literature," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(20), pages 1-41, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Moti Michaeli & Daniel Spiro, 2018. "Prescriptive Norms and Social Comparisons," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-12, December.
    2. Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2013. "Testing Enforcement Strategies In The Field: Threat, Moral Appeal And Social Information," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 634-660, June.
    3. Ugo Troiano & Ricardo Perez-Truglia, 2015. "Tax Debt Enforcement: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in the United States," 2015 Meeting Papers 134, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. Chen, Jingnan (Cecilia) & Fonseca, Miguel A. & Grimshaw, Shaun B., 2021. "When a nudge is (not) enough: Experiments on social information and incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    5. Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2009. "Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_31, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    6. Perez-Truglia, Ricardo & Troiano, Ugo, 2018. "Shaming tax delinquents," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 120-137.
    7. te Velde, Vera L., 2022. "Heterogeneous norms: Social image and social pressure when people disagree," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 194(C), pages 319-340.
    8. Dur, Robert & Fleming, Dimitry & van Garderen, Marten & van Lent, Max, 2021. "A social norm nudge to save more: A field experiment at a retail bank," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    9. Dwenger, Nadja & Kleven, Henrik & Rasul, Imran & Rincke, Johannes, 2014. "Extrinsic vs Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance. Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Germany," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100389, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    10. Kjetil Telle, 2012. "Monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations. Lessons from a natural field experiment in Norway," Discussion Papers 680, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    11. Michael Kurschilgen, 2023. "Moral awareness polarizes people’s fairness judgments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(2), pages 339-364, August.
    12. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2004. "Illegal, Immoral, Fattening or What?: How Deterrence and Responsive Regulation Shape Tax Morale," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200426, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    13. Philipp Doerrenberg & Jan Schmitz, 2017. "Tax compliance and information provision. A field experiment with small firms," Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE), vol. 1(1), pages 47-54, February.
    14. Bachas, Pierre & Fattal Jaef, Roberto N. & Jensen, Anders, 2019. "Size-dependent tax enforcement and compliance: Global evidence and aggregate implications," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 203-222.
    15. Castro, Lucio & Scartascini, Carlos, 2015. "Tax compliance and enforcement in the pampas evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 65-82.
    16. Yann Bramoullé & Habiba Djebbari & Bernard Fortin, 2020. "Peer Effects in Networks: A Survey," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 12(1), pages 603-629, August.
    17. Philipp Doerrenberg & Andreas Peichl, 2022. "Tax Morale and the Role of Social Norms and Reciprocity - Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 78(1-2), pages 44-86.
    18. Nordblom, Katarina, 2017. "Tax Morale and Policy Intervention," Working Papers in Economics 711, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    19. Giulia Mascagni, 2018. "From The Lab To The Field: A Review Of Tax Experiments," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 273-301, April.
    20. Julie Berry Cullen & Nicholas Turner & Ebonya Washington, 2021. "Political Alignment, Attitudes toward Government, and Tax Evasion," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 135-166, August.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:9:y:2017:i:1:p:152-216. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.