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Bureaucrats or Politicians? Comment

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Author Info
Fuhito Kojima
Abstract

Alesina and Tabellini (2007) investigate the normative criteria for allocating policy tasks to bureaucrats versus politicians. While they establish criteria with respect to a number of parameters, they do not give a criterion with respect to the degree of imperfect monitoring. We establish an unambiguous criterion about imperfect monitoring. (JEL D72, D73)

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 98 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 561-62
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:1:p:561-62

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This page was last updated on 2008-7-16.


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