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• Klaus Kultti
• Tuomas Takalo

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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 96 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 82-86
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:2:p:82-86

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References listed on IDEAS
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1. Kultti, Klaus & Takalo, Tuomas, 2008. "Optimal fragmentation of intellectual property rights," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 137-149, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, 2004. "An empirical look at software patents," Working Papers 03-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • James Bessen & Robert M Hunt, 2004. "An Empirical Look at Software Patents," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000167, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, 2007. "An Empirical Look at Software Patents," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(1), pages 157-189, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Klaus Kultti & Tuomas Takalo & Juuso Toikka, 2005. "Patents Hinder Collusion," Industrial Organization 0503015, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
4. Vincenzo Denicolo & Luigi Alberto Franzoni, 2004. "Patents, Secrets, and the First-Inventor Defense," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(3), pages 517-538, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Denicolo, Vincenzo & Franzoni, Luigi Alberto, 2003. "The contract theory of patents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 365-380, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Wesley M. Cohen & Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, 2000. "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)," NBER Working Papers 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Wesley M Cohen & Richard R Nelson & John P Walsh, 2003. "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not)," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000624, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
7. Nancy T. Gallini, 2002. "The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 131-154, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 2004. "Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 1-22, Spring.

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This page was last updated on 2008-7-16.