Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

• Klaus Kultti
• Tuomas Takalo

Download Info

To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 96 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 82-86
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:96:y:2006:i:2:p:82-86

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research

Keywords:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

1. Kultti, Klaus & Takalo, Tuomas, 2008. "Optimal fragmentation of intellectual property rights," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 137-149, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, 2004. "An empirical look at software patents," Working Papers 03-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • James Bessen & Robert M Hunt, 2004. "An Empirical Look at Software Patents," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000167, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   • James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, 2007. "An Empirical Look at Software Patents," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(1), pages 157-189, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Klaus Kultti & Tuomas Takalo & Juuso Toikka, 2005. "Patents Hinder Collusion," Industrial Organization 0503015, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
4. Vincenzo Denicolo & Luigi Alberto Franzoni, 2004. "Patents, Secrets, and the First-Inventor Defense," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(3), pages 517-538, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Wesley M. Cohen & Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, 2000. "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)," NBER Working Papers 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Wesley M Cohen & Richard R Nelson & John P Walsh, 2003. "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not)," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000624, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
6. Denicolo, Vincenzo & Franzoni, Luigi Alberto, 2003. "The contract theory of patents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 365-380, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Nancy T. Gallini, 2002. "The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 131-154, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 2004. "Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 1-22, Spring.

Did you know? About 1000 archives contribute their bibliographic data to RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-13.