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The Independent Invention Defence in Intellectual Property

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Author Info
Maurer, Stephen M
Scotchmer, Suzanne

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Abstract

Patents differ from other forms of intellectual property in that independent invention is not a defence to infringement. We argue that the patent rule is inferior in any industry where the cost of independently inventing a product is not too much less than (no less than half) the inventor's cost. First, the threat of entry by independent invention would induce patent holders to license the technology, lowering the market price. Second, a defence of independent invention would reduce the wasteful duplication of R&D effort that occurs in patent races. In either case, the threat of independent invention creates a mechanism that limits patent-holders' profits to levels commensurate with their costs of R&D. Copyright 2002 by The London School of Economics and Political Science

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Publisher Info
Article provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.

Volume (Year): 69 (2002)
Issue (Month): 276 (November)
Pages: 535-47
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Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:69:y:2002:i:276:p:535-47

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  1. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2003. "Intellectual Property: When is it the Best Incentive System?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000532, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Nancy Gallini and Suzanne Scotchmer., 2001. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," Economics Working Papers E01-303, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, 2005. "Intellectual property and market size," Staff Report 360, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  4. Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2005. "IP and Market Size," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000836, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Raquel Fernandez & Alessandra Fogli, 2005. "Culture: an empirical investigation of beliefs, work, and fertility," Staff Report 361, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Amisano, Franco & Cassone, Alberto, 2005. "Proprietà intellettuale e mercati: Il ruolo della tecnologia e conseguenze microeconomiche," P.O.L.I.S. department's Working Papers 58, Department of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS. [Downloadable!]
  7. Cugno Franco & Ottoz Elisabetta, 2006. "Static inefficiency of compulsory licensing: quantity vs. price competition," Department of Economics Working Papers 200606, University of Turin. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2001. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1010, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
  9. Elisabetta Ottoz & Franco Cugno, 2004. "The independent invention defence in a Cournot duopoly model," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 12(5), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-10-5.

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