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Uncertainty, Capacity and Flexibility: the Monopoly Case

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  • Marcel Boyer
  • Michel Moreaux

Abstract

It is generally expected that profit maximisation leads a firm to choose a more flexible plant the more uncertain its demand function is and/or the more variable is the sequence of quantities to produce. In this paper we make explicit the precise conditions under which this intuitive argument is valid. We show that a sufficient condition is that the increase in uncertainty must involve only those states of demand for which the firm is initially active, that is for which it is able to cover quasi-fixed and variable costs. These are common assumptions in most flexibility choice models. But we also show that a reverse relation between the variability in demand and plant flexibility may exist under reasonable cost and demand conditions, even under the most common definition of increased uncertainty in demand and the most acceptable notion of plant flexibility. We give an example of such an inverse relation.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Boyer & Michel Moreaux, 1989. "Uncertainty, Capacity and Flexibility: the Monopoly Case," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 15-16, pages 291-313.
  • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1989:i:15-16:p:291-313
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    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20075761
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    Cited by:

    1. Marcel Boyer & Jacques Robert, 1996. "Ex Ante Incentives and Ex Post Flexibility," CIRANO Working Papers 96s-14, CIRANO.
    2. Meunier, Guy & Ponssard, Jean-Pierre, 2014. "Capacity decisions with demand fluctuations and carbon leakage," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 436-454.
    3. Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 2000. "Flexibilité et stratégies d’impartition," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 76(2), pages 199-224, juin.
    4. David Martimort & Stéphane Straub, 2016. "How To Design Infrastructure Contracts In A Warming World: A Critical Appraisal Of Public–Private Partnerships," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(1), pages 61-88, February.
    5. Thierry Lafay, 2011. "A Competitive Duopoly where Information Spillovers can be Mutually Advantageous," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 77(1), pages 79-100.
    6. Marcel Boyer, 1997. "L'économie des organisations : Mythes et réalités," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-02, CIRANO.
    7. Marcel Boyer & Séverine Clamens, 1997. "Strategic Adoption of a New Technology under Uncertain Implementation," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-40, CIRANO.
    8. BOYER, Marcel & MOREAUX, Michel, 1995. "Capacity Commitment Versus Flexibility: The Technological Choice Nexus in a Strategic Context," Cahiers de recherche 9556, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    9. Boyer, Marcel & Poitevin, Michel, 1989. "Commentaire sur le texte de Stylianos Perrakis," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 65(4), pages 547-554, décembre.
    10. Marcel Boyer & Michel Moreaux, 1997. "Capacity Commitment versus Flexibility," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 347-376, June.
    11. Boyer, Marcel, 1996. "L’économie des organisations," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 72(3), pages 247-274, septembre.
    12. David Martimort & Stéphane Straub, 2016. "How To Design Infrastructure Contracts In A Warming World: A Critical Appraisal Of Public–Private Partnerships," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57, pages 61-88, February.
    13. Boyer, Marcel & Robert, Jacques, 2006. "Organizational inertia and dynamic incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 324-348, March.
    14. David Martimort & Stéphane Straub, 2011. "How to Design Public-Private Partnerships in a Warming World? - When Infrastructure Becomes a Really “Hot” Topic," Working Papers 2011/25, Maastricht School of Management.

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