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Central Bank Independence and Accountability: The New Zealand Case

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  • Stephen Kirchner

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  • Stephen Kirchner, 1995. "Central Bank Independence and Accountability: The New Zealand Case," Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics, vol. 2(2), pages 169-180.
    • Handle: RePEc:acb:agenda:v:2:y:1995:i:2:p:169-180
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    File URL: http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p43541/pdf/article0422.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Manfred Neumann, 1991. "Precommitment by central bank independence," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 95-112, June.
    2. Greenfield, Robert L & Yeager, Leland B, 1983. "A Laissez-Faire Approach to Monetary Stability," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 15(3), pages 302-315, August.
    3. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, And Independance: Theory And Evidence," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 1-10, December.
    4. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    5. Andreas Fischer, 1993. "Inflation Targeting: The New Zealand and Canadian Cases," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 13(1), pages 1-27, Spring/Su.
    6. Michele Lloyd, 1992. "The New Zealand approach to central bank autonomy," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 55, Septemebe.
    7. William J. McDonough, 1994. "An independent central bank in a democratic country: the Federal Reserve experience," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 19(Spr), pages 1-6.
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    1. Stephen Kirchner, 1996. "‘Digital What?’: Electronic Money and the Future of Australia’s Financial System," Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics, vol. 3(4), pages 523-528.

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