The Effect of Inspector Absence on Referee Behavior: Evidence from Amateur Soccer

Periodic inspections play a crucial role in maintaining regulatory compliance, yet the need for constant inspection to maintain effective compliance remains a topic of discussion. We exploit a quasi-experimental setting that allows for a clean identification of changes in behavior even in the inspector’s absence: the inspector absence effect (IAE). Using data from amateur soccer, our findings show that amateur referees impose significantly fewer disciplinary sanctions when they are not inspected, which suggests that the awareness of being monitored influences their enforcement of the rules. The effect varies by career stage: aspiring referees reduce disciplinary sanctions in the inspector’s absence, whereas peak-career referees may become somewhat stricter. Furthermore, unannounced inspections influence behavior, albeit with a less pronounced IAE. These results provide causal empirical evidence that periodic inspections significantly impact decision-making. Our study emphasizes the importance of inspection design that influences agent behavior and ensures consistent rule enforcement.