IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Corporate Governance ohne Vertrauen? Ökonomische Konsequenzen der Agency-Theorie


  • Nippa, Michael
  • Grigoleit, Jens


Both, discussion and legislation in the field of corporate governance have been dominated by new institutional economics, especially agency theory. Due to its restrictive assumptions agency theory systematically disregards some important aspects that influence cooperative interaction between shareholder and manager. In addition to the widely accepted crowding out-effect of intrinsic motivation resulting from measures of explicit control, one can assume that extensive monitoring and performance-based incentive systems will induce a similar crowding out effect of trust. Thus, the objective of our paper is to conceptually prove this thesis. We will show that agency-theory implies a suboptimal high degree of explicit control for various social-psychological factors are neglected. Finally, we derive important implications for developing an alternative corporate governanceapproach, which considers trust as a relevant alternative for designing efficient corporate governance systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Nippa, Michael & Grigoleit, Jens, 2006. "Corporate Governance ohne Vertrauen? Ökonomische Konsequenzen der Agency-Theorie," Freiberg Working Papers 2006,01, TU Bergakademie Freiberg, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:tufwps:200601

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Engle, Robert F. & Kroner, Kenneth F., 1995. "Multivariate Simultaneous Generalized ARCH," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(01), pages 122-150, February.
    2. Rao, Vadhindran K., 2000. "Preference-free optimal hedging using futures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 223-228, February.
    3. Stephen A. Ross, 2005. "Mutual Fund Separation in Financial Theory—The Separating Distributions," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Theory Of Valuation, chapter 10, pages 309-356 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Meyer, Jack & Rasche, Robert H, 1992. "Sufficient Conditions for Expected Utility to Imply Mean-Standard Deviation Rankings: Empirical Evidence Concerning the Location and Scale Condition," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(410), pages 91-106, January.
    5. Lence, Sergio H., 1995. "On the optimal hedge under unbiased futures prices," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(3-4), pages 385-388, March.
    6. Phillips, P C B, 1987. "Time Series Regression with a Unit Root," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 277-301, March.
    7. Ederington, Louis H, 1979. "The Hedging Performance of the New Futures Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 34(1), pages 157-170, March.
    8. Bollerslev, Tim, 1986. "Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 307-327, April.
    9. Michael S. Haigh & Matthew T. Holt, 2002. "Combining time-varying and dynamic multi-period optimal hedging models," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 29(4), pages 471-500, December.
    10. Bollerslev, Tim, 1990. "Modelling the Coherence in Short-run Nominal Exchange Rates: A Multivariate Generalized ARCH Model," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 72(3), pages 498-505, August.
    11. Holthausen, Duncan M, 1979. "Hedging and the Competitive Firm under Price Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 989-995, December.
    12. Engle, Robert F, 1982. "Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of the Variance of United Kingdom Inflation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 987-1007, July.
    13. Benninga, Simon & Eldor, Rafael & Zilcha, Itzhak, 1983. "Optimal hedging in the futures market under price uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 141-145.
    14. Dickey, David A & Fuller, Wayne A, 1981. "Likelihood Ratio Statistics for Autoregressive Time Series with a Unit Root," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 1057-1072, June.
    15. Kroner, Kenneth F. & Sultan, Jahangir, 1993. "Time-Varying Distributions and Dynamic Hedging with Foreign Currency Futures," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 28(04), pages 535-551, December.
    16. Phillips, P C B, 1987. "Time Series Regression with a Unit Root," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 277-301, March.
    17. Figlewski, Stephen, 1984. " Hedging Performance and Basis Risk in Stock Index Futures," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(3), pages 657-669, July.
    18. Gershon Feder & Richard E. Just & Andrew Schmitz, 1980. "Futures Markets and the Theory of the Firm under Price Uncertainty," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 317-328.
    19. Fama, Eugene F & French, Kenneth R, 1987. "Commodity Futures Prices: Some Evidence on Forecast Power, Premiums,and the Theory of Storage," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 60(1), pages 55-73, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Lippert, Inge, 2008. "Perspektivenverschiebungen in der Corporate Governance: Neuere Ansätze und Studien der Corporate-Governance-Forschung," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Knowledge, Production Systems and Work SP III 2008-302, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    2. Patrick Velte, 2010. "Stewardship-Theorie," Metrika: International Journal for Theoretical and Applied Statistics, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 285-293, April.

    More about this item


    Trust; distrust; corporate governance; agency-theory;

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:tufwps:200601. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.