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A procedural and object-oriented statistical language

Author

Listed:
  • Kobayashi, Ikunori
  • Fujiwara, Takeshi
  • Nakano, Junji
  • Yamamoto, Yoshikazu

Abstract

A language of a statistical system is important, even though it bas an effective graphical user interface. A language may be used to control the statistical system at will and to implement new statistical procedures which are not realized in the system at the beginning. This paper introduces the features and the syntax of the language of the statistical system Jasp (Java based statistical processor). We use a procedural function-based script 1anguage Puuts as the basis of the language, and add object-oriented mechanism thinking much of ease, flexibility and extendibility.

Suggested Citation

  • Kobayashi, Ikunori & Fujiwara, Takeshi & Nakano, Junji & Yamamoto, Yoshikazu, 2001. "A procedural and object-oriented statistical language," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2001,68, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200168
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    11. Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November.
    12. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1986. "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages 251-278, October.
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