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Revealed Notions of Distributive Justice II – Experimental Evidence

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  • Becker, Nicole
  • Häger, Kirsten
  • Heufer, Jan

Abstract

We report the results of a combination of a dictator experiment with either a 'social planner' or a 'veil of ignorance' experiment. The experimental design and the analysis of the data are based on the theoretical framework proposed in the companion paper by Becker, Häger, and Heufer (BHH, 2013), in which we introduce a 'notion of distributive justice' by which individuals trade off equality and efficiency. The purpose of the theoretical framework is to explain preferences in dictator experiments by a combination of selfishness and concerns for distributive justice. Most participants conform very well with the Agreement and Symmetry axioms proposed in BHH; we find that for 80% of participants the evidence is very strong. The experiment therefore demonstrates that most participants' behaviour in dictator experiments can be explained by a combination of selfishness and concerns for distributive justice. We also provide a rough classification of preferences and notions of distributive justice and show that participants' strength of the sense for justice (Karni and Safra 2002b) can be compared nonparametrically.

Suggested Citation

  • Becker, Nicole & Häger, Kirsten & Heufer, Jan, 2013. "Revealed Notions of Distributive Justice II – Experimental Evidence," Ruhr Economic Papers 444, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:rwirep:444
    DOI: 10.4419/86788501
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    Cited by:

    1. van Bruggen, Paul & Heufer, Jan, 2017. "Afriat in the lab," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 546-550.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    altruism; dictator games; distributive justice; experimental economics; nonparametric analysis; preference decomposition; revealed preference; social preferences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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