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Abstract
In November 2024, the Chinese registered bulk carrier, the Yi Peng 3 was found to have been the only vessel in the area where cuts had been made in two telecommunication cables in the Baltic Sea, between Gotland and Estonia. With unexpected rapidity, the Yi Peng 3 was stopped by the Royal Danish Navy and, after delays by Chinese authorities, their offi cials arrived for a cursory examination, then the ship was released. The two cables had already been repaired and evidence collected about the damage, together with evidence of previous attempts by the same vessel to cut electricity and telecommunication cables. Then in December 2024, a vessel belonging to the 'shadow fl eet' used by Russia to breach oil sanctions cut an electricity interconnector and four telecommunications cables in the Gulf of Finland. The Eagle S, registered in the Cook Islands, was ordered into Finnish territorial waters, where it was boarded by special forces and taken to a port. These incidents highlighted the challenges of responding to attacks on undersea cables conducted by Russia as part of its undeclared war against NATO. It requires rapid notifi cation of breaks to the national authorities (e.g., CERT), passed immediately to coast guard and navy, and consultation with prosecutors, before making immediate interventions to seize the vessels concerned and gather evidence, followed by quick repairs to the broken cables. This is possible only with careful administrative, judicial and political coordination in a complex system of polycentric governance. The international conventions, especially in the Danish Straits, make it diffi cult for coastal states to arrest vessels and to protect cables, especially beyond territorial waters. Nonetheless, the Eagle S incident demonstrated that a rapid response can be eff ective. In the longer term such threats require improvements to network resilience and better coordination amongst operators, government agencies and countries, given the diffi culties in changing international conventions. One crucial change could be the inclusion of cable cutting in the defi nition of piracy.
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