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Rewarding in International Law

Author

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  • van Aaken, Anne
  • Simsek, Betül

Abstract

The question of why states comply with international law has long been at the forefront of international law and international relations scholarship. The compliance discussion has largely focused on negative incentives for states to comply. We argue that there is another, undertheorized mechanism: rewarding. We provide a typology as well as illustrations of how rewards can be applied. Furthermore, we explore the ratio nale, the potential, and the limitations of rewarding, drawing on rationalist as well as psychological approaches. Both give ample arguments to make more use of rewarding in international law.

Suggested Citation

  • van Aaken, Anne & Simsek, Betül, 2021. "Rewarding in International Law," ILE Working Paper Series 47, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ilewps:47
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/230525/1/ile-wp-2021-47.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Endrich, Marek & Gutmann, Jerg, 2020. "Pacem in Terris: Are Papal Visits Good News for Human Rights?," ILE Working Paper Series 37, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.

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