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Replicating "Run-off elections in the laboratory"

Author

Listed:
  • Hausladen, Carina I.
  • Hu, Shiang-Hung
  • Levin, Joel M.

Abstract

Bouton et al. (2022) compare the properties of majority run-off and plurality rule elections in a laboratory setting, focusing on Duverger's prediction that plurality rule leads to higher levels of strategic voting. They produce a causal estimate of the difference in incidence of strategic voting across systems, finding more strategic voting under the plurality rule. However, they find that coordination is only higher under the plurality rule when voters are sufficiently divided over which candidate they prefer. They conclude that differences in electoral outcomes and voters' welfare are modest. We are able to computationally reproduce the original study's main findings using the authors' replication package. The replication package contained both raw data and a cleaned dataset, but did not include a script for cleaning the raw data or a codebook to make sense of it. Therefore, the majority of our work focused on producing code to evaluate and clean the authors' raw data. The authors sent a very helpful response to an earlier draft of this report and their communication improved the quality of our replication effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Hausladen, Carina I. & Hu, Shiang-Hung & Levin, Joel M., 2024. "Replicating "Run-off elections in the laboratory"," I4R Discussion Paper Series 99, The Institute for Replication (I4R).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:99
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/281134/1/I4R-DP099.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Majority run-off system; Plurality rule; Duverger's prediction; Voting behavior; Sincere voting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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