The Russian grain trap food security & political development in sub-Saharan Africa

The weaponization of agricultural trade has once again emerged as critical in the study of modern geopolitics due to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Although Russia has used its wheat exports as a means of enhancing its geopolitical influence over countries in the Global South, evidence on the impact of such a policy is scarce. This paper assesses the impact of reliance on Russian and Ukrainian wheat imports on food security and political development in sub-Saharan African countries. The panel data for the analysis come from 35 African countries between 2005 and 2024. The Bartik-style shift-share instrumental variables (IV) model utilizes exogenous variables derived from the historical shares of wheat that African countries imported from Russia and Ukraine multiplied by the export contractions caused by geopolitical conflicts in 2014 (Crimea annexation) and 2022 (full-scale invasion of Ukraine). The dependence on Russian wheat has had a uniquely adverse impact upon the development of sub-Saharan Africa, whereas this has not been the case for the dependence on Ukrainian wheat. Prior to 2022, the dependence on Russian wheat had no significant impact upon the reduction of undernourishment in Africa, but had a significant impact on the rise of political instability. After 2022, though, the Russian wheat played a crucial role in the food insecurity within the region. While democratic indices remained unaffected by Russian wheat, other geopolitical factors such as U.S. development aid and Chinese development finance were not able to counter the negative effects of Russian wheat exports. Our findings identify an independent vector of autocratic influence enabled through Russian agricultural exports. For sustainable political development within sub-Saharan Africa, the diversification of staple food suppliers is urgently required.