Outsourcing motives, competitiveness and taxation
This paper shows the strategic aspects of international outsourcing in an oligopolistic market, if outsourcing is attractive because of fixed cost savings. We show that outsourcing decisions are strategic substitutes. Furthermore, we demonstrate that due to decreasing individual output, intensified competition increases the incentive to save fixed costs of integrated production and thus leads to more outsourcing. Additionally, we analyse how domestic costs and taxation affect the equilibrium level of outsourcing and employment. Here, we find that lower domestic costs decrease the proportion of outsourcing and therefore, increase employment. Concerning the impact of taxation, we find that a lower consumption tax on output decreases outsourcing. In case of a reversed outsourcing motivation, where outsourcing is associated with lower marginal costs but higher fixed costs than the domestic production, we show that the opposite effects concerning competition and taxation occur.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Garystr. 21, 14195 Berlin (Dahlem)|
Phone: (030) 838 2272
Fax: (030) 838 2129
Web page: http://www.wiwiss.fu-berlin.de/en/index.html
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:201033. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.