A Price is a signal: on intrinsic motivation and crowding-out
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References listed on IDEAS
- Guth, Werner & Huck, Steffen & Ockenfels, Peter, 1996. "Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(436), pages 593-604, May.
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KeywordsIntrinsic Motivation; Crowding-out; Signaling;
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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