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The Democracy Premium Is Context-Dependent: Voting Entitlement and Cooperation in Germany and China

Author

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  • Tontrup, Stephan
  • Gaissmaier, Wolfgang

Abstract

Recent lab and field experiments have provided evidence of a positive voting effect: cooperation in social dilemmas appears to be stronger when policies are chosen by vote instead of being imposed. It remains less clear what drives this so-called "democracy premium" and whether the effect is universal. While some studies suggest that selecting cooperation-friendly rules signals cooperativeness, others suggest the effect may be limited to those who won the vote and feel committed to it. Our study identifies a different mechanism for the democracy premium: we find that the mere entitlement to voting rights enhances cooperation in a public goods game. Moreover, participating in the voting process increased individuals' cooperativeness regardless of whether their preferred rules prevailed. We also show that this democracy premium is not universal. We conducted the study in two countries at opposite ends of the democracy spectrum: Germany and China. While the German evidence supported the democracy premium across two separate laboratories, the premium was, as hypothesized, significantly smaller in our Chinese data. In both Chinese laboratories, we observed no voting benefits at all—with contributions being, if anything, lower when rules were chosen democratically.

Suggested Citation

  • Tontrup, Stephan & Gaissmaier, Wolfgang, 2026. "The Democracy Premium Is Context-Dependent: Voting Entitlement and Cooperation in Germany and China," EconStor Preprints 335551, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, revised 2026.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:esprep:335551
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4547585
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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