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Combinatorial Properties of Strength Groups in Round Robin Tournaments

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  • Briskorn, Dirk

Abstract

A single round robin tournament (RRT) consists of a set T of n teams (n even) and a set P of n - 1 periods. The teams have to be scheduled such that each team plays exactly once against each other team and such that each team plays exactly once per period. In order to establish fairness among teams we consider a partition of teams into strength groups. Then, the goal is to avoid a team playing against extremely weak or extremely strong teams in consecutive periods. We propose two concepts ensuring different degrees of fairness. One question arising here is whether a single RRT exists for a given number of teams n and a given partition of the set of teams into strength groups or not. In this paper we examine this question. Furthermore, we analyse the computational complexity of cost minimization problems in the presense of strength group requirements.

Suggested Citation

  • Briskorn, Dirk, 2006. "Combinatorial Properties of Strength Groups in Round Robin Tournaments," Manuskripte aus den Instituten für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Kiel 611, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:cauman:611
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    Cited by:

    1. Briskorn, Dirk & Drexl, Andreas, 2006. "Integer programming models for round robin tournaments," Manuskripte aus den Instituten für Betriebswirtschaftslehre der Universität Kiel 613, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre.

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