Delegation of Control Rights, Ownership Concentration, and the Decline of External Finance
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- Inderst, Roman & Müller, Holger M., 1999. "Delegation of control rights, ownership concentration, and the decline of external finance," Papers 99-68, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
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NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-07-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-1999-07-12 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-FIN-1999-07-12 (Finance)
- NEP-IND-1999-07-12 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-LAW-1999-07-12 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-1999-07-12 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PKE-1999-07-12 (Post Keynesian Economics)
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