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Long-run Evolution of Local Interaction Structures in Games

Author

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  • Berninghaus, Siegfried K.

    () (Universität Karlsruhe)

  • Ehrhart, Karl-Martin

    () (Universitaet Karlsruhe)

Abstract

In game-theoretical models with local interaction it is usually assumed that fixed local interaction structures are imposed exogenously and do not evolve during the course of the game. However, this assumption does not make much sense in economics. We model the evolution of interaction structures by applying a simple version of J. Holland`s Genetic Algorithm. As one of the main result we are able to characterize the local interaction structures surviving in the long run. Furthermore, by interpreting our results in an institutional framework we gain new insight into the working of Rawls` principle of distributional justice.

Suggested Citation

  • Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, 1998. "Long-run Evolution of Local Interaction Structures in Games," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 98-61, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  • Handle: RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:98-61
    Note: Financial Support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged. In carrying out this project, we benefited very much from the discussion in the seminar on Genetic Algorithms at the University of Karlsruhe.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Kosfeld, 2002. "Stochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(2), pages 321-339.

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