Long-run Evolution of Local Interaction Structures in Games
In game-theoretical models with local interaction it is usually assumed that fixed local interaction structures are imposed exogenously and do not evolve during the course of the game. However, this assumption does not make much sense in economics. We model the evolution of interaction structures by applying a simple version of J. Holland`s Genetic Algorithm. As one of the main result we are able to characterize the local interaction structures surviving in the long run. Furthermore, by interpreting our results in an institutional framework we gain new insight into the working of Rawls` principle of distributional justice.
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|Date of creation:||01 Sep 1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Financial Support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged. In carrying out this project, we benefited very much from the discussion in the seminar on Genetic Algorithms at the University of Karlsruhe.|
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