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Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules

  • Maug, Ernst

    (Chair for Corporate Finance, University of Mannheim and Sonderforschungsbereich 504)

  • Rydqvist, Kristian

    (SUNY at Binghamton - School of Management)

Registered author(s):

    We study shareholder voting on management proposals. We build on a simple model of strategic voting, provide structural estimates of its parameters, and derive testable implications. The evidence suggests that voting is strategic in the sense that shareholders take into account the information of other shareholders when making their voting decisions. We conclude that strategic voting prevents incorrect rejections of management proposals.

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    Paper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universit├Ąt Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim in its series Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications with number 07-35.

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    Length: 47 pages
    Date of creation: 26 Jun 2007
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:07-35
    Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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