Network Formation in Symmetric 2x2 Games
A population of players is considered in which each agent can select her neighbors in order to play a symmetric 2x2 game with each of them. The result of the simultaneous neighborhood choice of each agent is a network on the population from. We analyze all types of 2x2 games and show how the payoff structure in the 2x2 games affects the resulting equilibrium networks. Depending on the size of the communication costs the resulting equilibrium networks may be characterized by bipartite graphs if the coordination game is of the Hawk/Dove type while networks show a tendency to build complete or disconnected graphs if agents play a pure coordination game. Furthermore, for each 2x2 game we determine the equilibrium strategy distribution which is realized in the equilibrium networks.
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|Date of creation:||25 Nov 2004|
|Note:||Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.|
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