Nonlinear Incentive Contracting in Walrasian Markets: A Cournot Approach
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- Hellwig, Martin, 2000. "Nonlinear Incentive Contracting in Walrasian Markets : A Cournot Approach," Papers 00-42, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
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- Hellwig, Martin F., 2005.
"Nonlinear incentive provision in Walrasian markets: a Cournot convergence approach,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 120(1), pages 1-38, January.
- Martin Hellwig, 2004. "Nonlinear Incentive Provision in Walrasian Markets: A Cournot Convergence Approach," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004_8, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
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