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Strategic Information Revelation and Revenue Sharing in an R&D Race with Learning Labs

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  • Jos Jansen

Abstract

Inherent to most research projects is the fact that researchers learn about their project during the course of it. Research investments result in signals on development costs. This paper studies how this fact influences firms' investments, and how revenue sharing can correct inefficient behavior. We compare efficient R&D investments, equilibrium investments when signals are public, and equilibrium investments for private signals. Furthermore, we show which equilibrium is played when firms strategically reveal information. The paper focuses on the trade-off between incentives to acquire and reveal information, and incentives to develop the innovation. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Offenbarung strategischer Information und .Revenue Sharing. im F&E-Wettlauf der Forschungszentren) Charakteristisch für die meisten Forschungsvorhaben ist, daß die Wissenschaftler im Laufe der Forschung Informationen über ihr Projekt ansammeln. Forschungsinvestitionen stützen sich daher auch auf .Signale. über Entwicklungskosten. In diesem Aufsatz wird untersucht, welchen Einfluß dieses Phänomen auf Forschungsinvestitionen einzelner Unternehmen hat und in welcher Weise .revenue sharing. ineffizientes Verhalten überwinden kann. Der Autor vergleicht dabei die Forschungsinvestitionen in verschiedenen Regimen: industrieweite Projektwertmaximierung; Gleichgewichtsinvestitionen im Falle von öffentlichen Signalen; Gleichgewichtsinvestitionen im Falle von privaten Signalen, die strategisch von Unternehmen veröffentlicht werden können. In dem Beitrag werden die Anreize, Informationen zu sammeln, zu veröffentlichen und Produktinnovationen durchzuführen, herausgearbeitet.

Suggested Citation

  • Jos Jansen, 1999. "Strategic Information Revelation and Revenue Sharing in an R&D Race with Learning Labs," CIG Working Papers FS IV 99-11, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  • Handle: RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv99-11
    Note: This paper has been revised. Please see FS IV 01-06 for latest changes.
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