IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wzb/wzebiv/fsiv01-06.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Strategic Information Revelation and Revenue Sharing in an R&D Race

Author

Listed:
  • Jos Jansen

Abstract

Firms learn imperfectly about their cost of investment. We study how this information affects firms' incentives to invest in R&D by comparing investments and profits under public and private information. Revenue sharing between the winner and loser of the race, e.g. through licensing contracts, weakens the appropriability of the innovation's revenues, and creates free- rider effects. These free-rider effects not only soften R&D competition, but also affect the firms' incentives to acquire and reveal information. How much information firms eventually reveal, and consequently the information acquisition and innovation incentives, also depends on the verifiability of information. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Die strategische Preisgabe von Informationen und Einnahmeaufteilungen in einem F&E- Wettrennen) Unternehmen können ihre F&E-Investitionskosten nicht perfekt beobachten. Wir untersuchen, wie Informationen über diese Kosten die Investitionsanreize von Unternehmen beeinflusst. Zu diesem Zweck vergleichen wir das Investitionsniveau und die Gewinne bei öffentlich verfügbaren Informationen mit den entsprechenden Werten bei privaten Informationen. Eine Aufteilung der Einnahmen zwischen dem Gewinner und dem Verlierer des Rennens, beispielsweise durch Lizenzverträge, schwächt die Möglichkeiten, sich die Einnahmen aus der Innovation anzueignen und schafft Trittbrettfahrereffekte. Die Trittbrettfahrereffekte mildern nicht nur den F&E- Wettbewerb sondern beeinflussen auch die Anreize des Unternehmens, Informationen zu beschaffen und offenzulegen. Die Menge der Informationen die sich die Unternehmen beschaffen, die letztendlich von den Unternehmen preisgeben werden und die Innovationsanreize hängen darüber hinaus von der Überprüfbarkeit der Informationen ab.

Suggested Citation

  • Jos Jansen, 2001. "Strategic Information Revelation and Revenue Sharing in an R&D Race," CIG Working Papers FS IV 01-06, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  • Handle: RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv01-06
    Note: This is a revision of FS IV 99-11
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://skylla.wz-berlin.de/pdf/2001/iv01-06.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    R&D; Competition; Revelation; Information Acquisition; Revenue Sharing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv01-06. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jennifer Rontganger (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cicwzde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.