IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wrk/warwec/998.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Public Disclosure by ‘Small’ Traders

Author

Listed:
  • Gelsomini, Luca

    (IESEG School of Management (LEM CNRS); CRETA, University of Warwick)

Abstract

We model strategic trading by a rent-seeking insider, who exchanges without being spotted, and propose a comprehensive theory of market non-anonymity. Several novel results are established. They depend on asset value proprieties, beliefs, inter-temporal choices, and investors’ characteristics. In equilibrium, under a regulation mandating public trade revelation, disclosures may shift prices. If they do, uninformed manipulations arise only in some instances. Speci…cally, insiders constrained on asset holdings earn more than they would without such a disclosure rule. Consequently, mandating disclosures is unnecessary, as informative trades will be revealed voluntarily. This result reveals a previously unexplored link to the literature on (uncerti…ed/non-factual)announcements. JEL classification: D82 ;G12 ;G14 ; G38

Suggested Citation

  • Gelsomini, Luca, 2012. "Public Disclosure by ‘Small’ Traders," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 998, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:998
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2012/twerp_998a.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mandatory vs. voluntary public disclosure ; securities regulation ; insider trading ; market manipulation.;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:998. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Margaret Nash). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/dewaruk.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.