Subsidization Of Risky Investment Under Income Taxation And Moral Hazard
A simplified version of an analysis by Mayshar (1977) is established in order to expose and explain the key factor behind the case for subsidizing private risky investment. A critical evaluation of the analysis motivates an extension of the model to incorporate moral hazard. It is demonstrated that the main conclusion of the former analysis carries over to the revised model under reasonable assumptions.
|Date of creation:||1990|
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