IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Class Conflict and Bargaining under Monopoly Capitalism : The Impact of Mass Unemployment and some Evidence from the UK


  • Dowrick, Steve


Baran and Sweezy (1968, p85) argue that "the working class as a whole is (not) in a position to encroach on surplus ... under monopoly capitalism employers can and do pass on higher labour costs in the form of higher prices". In Section 2 I examine this claim that employers' power in product markets can transcend conflict over the process and pay of labour, discussing the implications for conflict between groups of workers as well as conflict between workers and employees. Despite ample evidence of employers' monopoly pricing power, there is also evidence that profit margins do change in response to workers' strength - an observation which, I argue, is not adequately explained by theories based on the threat of foreign competition or by theories of oligopolistic uncertainty. Section 4 explores the hypothesis that employers and workers bargain over jobs as well as wages, a hypothesis which could explain workers' potential to erode profit margins.

Suggested Citation

  • Dowrick, Steve, 1985. "Class Conflict and Bargaining under Monopoly Capitalism : The Impact of Mass Unemployment and some Evidence from the UK," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 261, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:261

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:261. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Margaret Nash). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.