Corporate Control, Social Choice and Capital Accumulation : an Asymmetrical Choice Approach
An asymmetrical choice approach is followed to analyse the link between corporate control, social choice and capital accummulation ; based on the explicit recognition of the existence of different classes in modern capitalist economies. It is argued that all existing attempts to explore the issue are insufficient in that they are based on a classless or classes do not matter-framework. We suggest that corporate decisions with regard to retentions do constrain the possibilities of choice over the consumption-saving patterns, of all - but a controlling subset of the owners - classes of the economy. Under plausible assumptions this acts beneficially on potential capital accumulation : a phenomenon due to, and being a specific characteristic of, todays large joint stock companies.
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|Date of creation:||1983|
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