Labour-Managed Firms and Monopsony Power
Monopsony Power in the labour market is shown to have important consequences for comparisions between Illyrian labour-managed firm (LMF) and a profit maximising capitalist firm (CF) operating in the same markets with the same technology. If the CF earns positive profits then workers earn more in the LMF than in the CF, and the level of employment in the LMF may be greater or less than in the CF. Monopsony power is also seen to have interesting implications for models of membership contraction in LMF's.
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|Date of creation:||1982|
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