Job Search and the Firm's Wage Offer Decisions : A Model of Null Offers
In this paper a model of a profit maximising firm's responses to job search is developed. This model explains the determinants of a firm's wage offer and the probability that a firm will be found in a state where it is optimal to make no offer (i.e. a 'null' offer). Comparative statics results for the case of constant returns technology are calculated and the implications of the model for a market chatacterised by search are discussed.
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|Date of creation:||1982|
|Date of revision:|
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