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Information Transmission in Political Factions

Author

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  • Francesco Squintani

    (University of Warwick)

Abstract

Political networks are often factional: like-minded politicians form groups around a small core of leaders, and few links cross ideological collections. I develop a model in which information transmission is a main reason such networks form. Politicians are partitioned into ideologically cohesive collections, transmission is sufficiently reliable but imperfect, and link costs are neither too high nor too low. Every expert–decision maker pair is equally likely and every politician assigns the same weight to every decision. I show that every efficient network is star-factional. In each ideological collection, politicians are connected to a unique leader, and only leaders communicate across collections. Star-factional networks arise as Nash equilibria of the bilateral network formation game and are the only equilibria immune to joint deviations. When politicians differ, efficient leadership favors those with greater expertise, authority, or relevance. If these characteristics are divided, multiple leaders may be efficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Squintani, 2026. "Information Transmission in Political Factions," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1631, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:1631
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    File URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2026/twerp_1631-squintani.pdf
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