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Extreme inequality aversion without separability

Author

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  • Kristof Bosmans

Abstract

Hammond (J Econ Theory 11, 465–467, 1975), Meyer (J Econ Theory 11, 119–132, 1975), and Lambert (The distribution and redistribution of income, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2001) provide the formal result connecting leximin and the idea of extreme inequality aversion for social preferences of the expected utility type. Using an analogous approach, we show that for social preferences not necessarily satisfying the separability axiom that underlies expected utility theory, the case of extreme inequality aversion is covered by the class of weakly maximin social preferences——i.e., the class of social preferences that give priority to the worst off in all cases in which the worst off is not indifferent.

Suggested Citation

  • Kristof Bosmans, 2006. "Extreme inequality aversion without separability," Public Economics Working Paper Series extrin, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Working Group Public Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpe:papers:extrin
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    2. Bosmans, Kristof, 2014. "Distribution-sensitivity of rank-dependent poverty measures," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 69-76.
    3. Jenny Kragl & Benjamin Bental & Peymaneh Safaynikoo, 2025. "Incentives and peer effects in the workplace: On the impact of envy and wage transparency on organizational design," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 80(1), pages 87-124, August.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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