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Unidimensional Voting and Multidimensional Issues: The Role of Interest Groups


  • Harvey S. James Jr.

    (University of Hartford)


Voting on unidimensional issues will produce equilibrium outcomes if voter preferences are single peaked. While the equilibrium outcomes would not necessarily be Pareto optimal, they would be stable. This paper shows that voting on multidimensional issues can produce stable equilibria if the voting occurs in one "super" ideological dimension. However, interest groups that expect to lose the ideological vote have an incentive to disrupt the voting process by arguing that the voting should not be ideological.

Suggested Citation

  • Harvey S. James Jr., 1996. "Unidimensional Voting and Multidimensional Issues: The Role of Interest Groups," Public Economics 9612001, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:9612001
    Note: Type of Document - Word 7.0; prepared on IBM PC Pentium running Windows95; to print on HP laserjet 4; pages: 7; figures: none

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    More about this item


    voting cycles; interest groups; social choice theory; preferences;

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General


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