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Unanimity Rule Constitutions

Author

Listed:
  • Hans Gersbach

    (University of Heidelberg)

  • Ulrich Erlenmaier

    (University of Heidelberg)

Abstract

In this paper, we show that the shortcomings of the unanimity rule can be alleviated by complementing it with the following constitutional principles: broad packages with many public projects can only be proposed once in a legislative term, the agenda setter needs to pay the highest taxes he is proposing, as well as a ban on subsidies. We show that such democratic constitutions yield efficient public project provision.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Gersbach & Ulrich Erlenmaier, 2000. "Unanimity Rule Constitutions," Public Economics 0004007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0004007
    Note: Type of Document - Tex; prepared on UNIX ; to print on PostScript; pages: 16; figures: .
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/pe/papers/0004/0004007.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unanimity rule; incomplete social contract; constitutional treatment rules; provision of public projects;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General

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