Unanimity Rule Constitutions
In this paper, we show that the shortcomings of the unanimity rule can be alleviated by complementing it with the following constitutional principles: broad packages with many public projects can only be proposed once in a legislative term, the agenda setter needs to pay the highest taxes he is proposing, as well as a ban on subsidies. We show that such democratic constitutions yield efficient public project provision.
|Date of creation:||04 Aug 2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Type of Document - Tex; prepared on UNIX ; to print on PostScript; pages: 16; figures: .|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://184.108.40.206|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0004007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.