Giffen's Paradox and Falsifiability
This paper considers the methodological problem which the Giffen paradox poses for the economist intent on establishing the empirical status of microeconomic theory. We then turn to more general considerations of the falsifiability of economic theory based on discussions by Adolf Grünbaum. These considerations lead us to reject Louis De Alessi's proposal for rectifying the problem of the Giffen paradox. Finally, we turn to the problem of ceteris paribus as it bears on De Alessi's argument, and observe that he has not resolved this problem.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0407003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.