Forest owners’ collective action against the risk of forest fire: a game theoretical approach
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Other versions of this item:
- Américo M. S. Carvalho Mendes, 2007. "Forest owners’ collective action against the risk of forest fire: a game theoretical approach," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 02, Católica Porto Business School, Universidade Católica Portuguesa.
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Keywordsforest owners’ associations; public and private goods joint supply; game theory;
- L - Industrial Organization
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2005-04-16 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2005-04-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2005-04-16 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2005-04-16 (Microeconomics)
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