Optimal Divisionalization of Cable Television Networks
In this article, a condition for the optimal division’s number is presented, for a market with two cable operators who offer a network service. First, a reason is presented to justify a partial covering of the national market from the cable operators. Second, a problem of moral hazard is revealed, which is able to appear through the implementation of franchising schemes with independent divisions.
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|Date of creation:||30 Mar 2003|
|Date of revision:||17 Apr 2003|
|Note:||Type of Document - Tex/WordPerfect/Handwritten; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX/UNIX Sparc TeX; to print on HP/PostScript/Franciscan monk; pages: 25 ; figures: included/request from author/draw your own|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org|
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