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Management von Mitarbeiterrisiken in Unternehmen Theoretische Grundlagen und Entwicklung eines praxistauglichen Erfassungs- und Auswertungsverfahrens


  • Henry Dannenberg



Die vorliegende Arbeit stellt einen Beitrag zur Bewertung von Mitarbeiterrisiken in Unternehmen dar. Es werden Ursachen determiniert, die einen Mitarbeiterausfall zur Folge haben. Diese werden auf ihre Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeit sowie möglicher Schäden hin untersucht. Darauf aufbauend wird ein Simulationsverfahren entwickelt, welches die Aggregation der individuellen Risiken zum Unternehmensrisiko ermöglicht. Abschließend wird ein Werkzeug vorgestellt, welches basierend auf den theoretischen Grundlagen eine praktische Umsetzung erlaubt. Dieses wird in zwei Unternehmen aufseine Anwendbarkeit hin überprüft.

Suggested Citation

  • Henry Dannenberg, 2005. "Management von Mitarbeiterrisiken in Unternehmen Theoretische Grundlagen und Entwicklung eines praxistauglichen Erfassungs- und Auswertungsverfahrens," Game Theory and Information 0507002, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0507002
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 144

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
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    6. Barry O'Neill, 1980. "A Problem of Rights Arbitration from the Talmud," Discussion Papers 445, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Roth, Alvin E, 1979. "Proportional Solutions to the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 775-777, May.
    8. Lopomo, Giuseppe & Ok, Efe A, 2001. "Bargaining, Interdependence, and the Rationality of Fair Division," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 263-283, Summer.
    9. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
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    More about this item


    Mitarbeiterrisiko; Risikomanagement; Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeit; Schadensszenario; Simulation;

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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