The Israel-Palestine Question – A Case for Application of Neutrosophic Game Theory
In our present paper, we have explored the possibilities and developed arguments for an application of principles of neutrosophic game theory as a generalization of the fuzzy game theory model to a better understanding of the Israel-Palestine problem in terms of the goals and governing strategies of either side. We build on an earlier attempted justification of a game theoretic explanation of this problem by Yakir Plessner (2001) and go on to argue in favour of a neutrosophic adaptation of the standard 2x2 zero-sum game theoretic model in order to identify an optimal outcome
|Date of creation:||17 Nov 2004|
|Note:||Type of Document - pdf; pages: 10. The paper is in the form of a short research note that posits and applies a neutrosophic game theory paradigm as an extension to the dynamic fuzzy game; in the specific context of the Israel-Palestine problem.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org|
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