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The Israel-Palestine Question – A Case for Application of Neutrosophic Game Theory

Author

Listed:
  • Sukanto Bhattacharya

    (School of Accounting - Economics & Finance, Deakin University, Australia)

  • Florentin Smarandache

    (Department of Mathematics & Statistics, The University of New Mexico, U.S.A.)

  • Mohammad Khoshnevisan

    (School of Accounting & Finance, Griffith University, Australia)

Abstract

In our present paper, we have explored the possibilities and developed arguments for an application of principles of neutrosophic game theory as a generalization of the fuzzy game theory model to a better understanding of the Israel-Palestine problem in terms of the goals and governing strategies of either side. We build on an earlier attempted justification of a game theoretic explanation of this problem by Yakir Plessner (2001) and go on to argue in favour of a neutrosophic adaptation of the standard 2x2 zero-sum game theoretic model in order to identify an optimal outcome

Suggested Citation

  • Sukanto Bhattacharya & Florentin Smarandache & Mohammad Khoshnevisan, 2004. "The Israel-Palestine Question – A Case for Application of Neutrosophic Game Theory," Game Theory and Information 0411007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0411007
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 10. The paper is in the form of a short research note that posits and applies a neutrosophic game theory paradigm as an extension to the dynamic fuzzy game; in the specific context of the Israel-Palestine problem.
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/0411/0411007.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Israel-Palestine conflict; Oslo Agreement; fuzzy games; neutrosophic semantic space;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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