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Riskless versus Risky Bargaining Procedures: the Aumann-Roth Controversy Revisited

  • Maria Montero

    (University of Nottingham)

  • Akira Okada

    (Kyoto University)

In a series of papers, Aumann and Roth discussed a game in which players can cooperate in pairs and two of them prefer to form a coalition with each other. Roth argued that the only rational outcome is that the players who prefer each other form a coalition; Aumann argued that all three coalitions are possible because the players have a problem of expectation coordination. A noncooperative analysis provides additional support for Aumann's arguments and shows that the difference between Aumann's and Roth's views can be traced back to a difference (risky versus riskless) in the bargaining procedure.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0305/0305002.pdf
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0305002.

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Date of creation: 23 May 2003
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0305002
Note: Type of Document -
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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