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Riskless versus Risky Bargaining Procedures: the Aumann-Roth Controversy Revisited

Author

Listed:
  • Maria Montero

    (University of Nottingham)

  • Akira Okada

    (Kyoto University)

Abstract

In a series of papers, Aumann and Roth discussed a game in which players can cooperate in pairs and two of them prefer to form a coalition with each other. Roth argued that the only rational outcome is that the players who prefer each other form a coalition; Aumann argued that all three coalitions are possible because the players have a problem of expectation coordination. A noncooperative analysis provides additional support for Aumann's arguments and shows that the difference between Aumann's and Roth's views can be traced back to a difference (risky versus riskless) in the bargaining procedure.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Montero & Akira Okada, 2003. "Riskless versus Risky Bargaining Procedures: the Aumann-Roth Controversy Revisited," Game Theory and Information 0305002, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0305002
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/0305/0305002.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Forming societies and the Shapley NTU value," Game Theory and Information 0401003, EconWPA.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    coalition formation; noncooperative bargaining; random proposers;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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