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The Core Can Be Accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps


  • László Á. Kóczy

    (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)


This paper strengthens the result of Sengupta and Sengupta (1996). We show that for the class of games with nonempty cores the core can be reached in a bounded number of proposals and counterproposals. Our result is more general than this: the boundedness holds for any two imputations with an indirect dominance relation between them.

Suggested Citation

  • László Á. Kóczy, 2002. "The Core Can Be Accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps," Game Theory and Information 0202001, EconWPA, revised 22 Mar 2002.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0202001
    Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript; pages: 8 ; figures: 1 - included. Work in progress, comments welcome!

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    dynamic cooperative game; indirect dominance; core.;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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