Optimal Collective Contract Without Peer Monitoring
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- Arup Daripa, 2005. "Optimal Collective Contract Without Peer Monitoring," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0519, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
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KeywordsInformal Credit; Market for Rights-To-Borrow; Participation Incentives; Competition in Contracts and Cream Skimming; Local Information; Rural Moneylending;
- O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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